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The Self-Help Approach to
Environmental Protection, Or,
Power to The People Revisited
Dennis Harnish*
I. Introduction
The environment, and our relationship to the environment, has
been carefully scrutinized in the past few decades. The study of na-
ture has made us aware of the ecological cycles upon which all life
on this planet depends.' Historical reflection teaches that cycles
characterize human institutions as well as nature. The natural
evolution of an institution should be accepted. Institutions created
to address a public concern should whither and disappear at the
same rate as the problem. The demise of an institution created to
remedy a public problem, however, is untimely and therefore a cause
for concern when the decline occurs before the problem is solved.
Congress created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
2
and later the Office of Surface Mining (OSM),3 to provide strong
regulation of activities having the potential to cause pollution. Crea-
tion of these agencies represents congressional efforts to preserve and
restore the aesthetic quality of the environment, protect public
health, and minimize property damage resulting from pollution.
When post-World War II population and technology booms began
to disrupt the delicate balance of nature and to create serious threats
to the health and welfare of the public,4 state and local government
units did not respond with sufficient vigor to diminish the pollution
* B.S. 1964, The Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1968, Comell Law School; Ad-
junct Professor, Dickinson School of Law.
1. For a general overview of the cyclical view of ecology, see Commoner, The Environ-
mental Costs of Economic Growth, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 261 (R. Dorfman and
N. Dorfman eds. 1972).
2. EPA was created pursuant to a Presidential Reorganization Plan in 1970. Recog.
Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. (1970).
3. OSM was statutorily created by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979), and is an independent regulatory agency within the
Department of Interior. Id § 1211.
4. E. Mishan, Growthmania, in EcONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 323 (R. Dorfman
and N. Dorfman eds. 1972).
threat.' Thus, federal regulation emerged.
Federal regulation of the environment has brought us closer to a
clean environment, but has been widely criticized.6 Furthermore,
the ability of EPA and OSM to be the guardians of the environment
will likely suffer because of substantial reductions in the agencies'
operating budgets.' As an offset to the diminished federal presence,
this article suggests methods to increase citizen participation in envi-
ronmental enforcement.
II. The Federal Watchdog Role
Local government initially had the primary responsibility for
regulation of the environment. Gradually, control over the environ-
ment passed to the state level and, in the 1970's, to the federal level.'
Federal dominance of environmental protection resulted from the
recognition that pollution is a national problem which requires a
comprehensive response. States were either unable or unwilling to
uniformly tackle serious environmental concerns. Consequently,
Congress designed several landmark environmental laws to ensure
that pollution would be approached in a vigorous manner, and in-
stalled the federal government as an environmental watchdog over
the efforts of the states. 9 An analysis of the Clean Air Act,' ° Clean
5. See infra text accompanying notes 8-9.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 20-28.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 24-26.
8. F. GEAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.02(l)(a) (1981).
9. The following history of air pollution control in the United States is illustrative:
Congress initially responded to the problem of air pollution by offering encour-
agement and assistance to the States. In 1955 the Surgeon General was authorized to
study the problem of air pollution, to support research, training, and demonstration
projects, and to provide technical assistance to state and local governments attempt-
ing to abate pollution. * * * In 1960 Congress directed the Surgeon General to focus
his attention on the health hazards resulting from motor vehicle emissions. The
Clean Air Act of 1963 authorized federal authorities to expand their research efforts,
to make grants to state air pollution control agencies, and also to intervene directly to
abate interstate pollution in limited circumstances. Amendments in 1965 broadened
federal authority to control motor vehicle emissions and to make grants to state pol-
lution control agencies.
The focus shifted somewhat in the Air Quality of 1967. It reiterated the premise
of the earlier Clean Air Act "that the prevention and control of air pollution at its
source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.
Its provisions, however, increased the federal role in the prevention of air pollution,
by according federal authorities certain powers of supervision and enforcement. But
the States generally retained wide latitude to determine both the air quality standards
which they would meet and the period of time in which they would do so.
The response of the States to these manifestations of increasing congressional con-
cern with airpollution was disappointing Even by 1970, stateplanning and implementa-
lion under the Air Quality Act of 1967 had made little progress. Congress reacted by
taking a stick to the States in theform of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. These
Amendments sharply increasedfederal authority and responsibility in the continuing ef-
/ort to combat air pollution.
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63-64 (1975) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
10. The Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. III 1980).
Water Act," Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), t 2
and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)'3
discloses that despite differences in approach, each Act empowers
the federal government to monitor state administration of programs
addressed to air quality, water quality, solid and hazardous waste
control, and surface mining. 4
Three methods accomplish federal control of environmental
regulation. First, EPA or OSM is empowered to promulgate regula-
tions specifying criteria and standards for a pollutant,'5 which are to
be incorporated into the relevant state program. ,6 Second, although
the states are encouraged to undertake primary administration of the
relevant program through the issuance of permits to persons engaged
in activities with possible impact on the ecology, under some of the
legislation EPA and OSM maintain the right to review state-issued
permits.'7 Third, EPA and OSM have the authority to directly en-
force compliance with the relevant pollution standards within a state
if the state fails to take action.18
Although EPA and OSM have diligently pursued their responsi-
bilities as overseers of state environmental management programs,
states have viewed the actions of EPA and OSM as restrictive federal
11. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 &
Supp. III 1980).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. III 1980).
13. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1980).
14. For a more specific outline of the interrelationship of federal and state environmental
programs, see L. WOOLLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ISSUES, THE RELATION OF FEDERAL
LAWS TO STATE PROGRAMS (1981).
15. See generaly The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409, 7411, 7412, 7422, 7423,
7457, 7472 to 7476, 7491, 7521, 7571, 7601 (1976 and Supp. III 1980); The Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1343 (1976 and Supp. 1II 1980); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6921-6924, 6942-6944 (1976 and Supp. Il 1980); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1235(a), 1251,
1252, 1265, 1266, 1272, 1281 (Supp. III 1980).
16. For the requirements for state programs that will be approved by EPA or OSM, see
generally The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407, 7410, 741 1(c), 7412(d), 7416, 7424, 7459,
7474(a), 7502, 7543, 7573 (1976 and Supp. III 1979); The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313,
1342, 1344, 1345 (1976 and Supp. III 1979). RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926, 6929, 6933, 6946, 6947
(1976 and Supp. III 1979); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1235, 1253 (Supp. III 1979).
If a state chooses not to submit a management program for approval, or if the state plan is
not adequate, EPA and OSM have the authority to promulgate and enforce a program for the
state. See The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(c), 7410(c), 741 1(c), 7412(d), 7424 (1976 and
Supp. III 1980); The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(i) (1976 and Supp. III 1980); RCRA,
42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (1976). EPA may only impose a program upon a state for hazardous waste
management. States have the option to choose whether to adopt a solid waste program but
EPA may deny funding to a state that refuses to implement a solid waste program. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6947(b) (1976); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (Supp. III 1979).
17. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7475, 7503 (1976 and Supp. IlI 1979);
The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342-1345 (1976 and Supp. III 1979); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925 (1976); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1257, 1260-1264 (Supp. III 1979).
18. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7477, 7543(b)(1), 7572 and 7603 (1976 and
Supp. III 1979); The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1976); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928 and
6973 (1976); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1254 and 1271 (Supp. II1 1979).
dominance in the realm of environmental regulation.' 9 Addition-
ally, federal agencies have inadequately enforced environmental
standards. Both EPA2° and OSM 2t have been criticized, even la-
belled "notoriously laggard," for ineffective enforcement.22 Much of
the inability of EPA and OSM to strictly enforce compliance with
pollution control requirements is because of the inherent limitations
of any environmental police force with the whole of our vast and
highly developed country as its "beat." The sheer magnitude of the
task makes it inconceivable to expect comprehensive monitoring of
the actions of potential polluters.23
Whatever degree of effectiveness EPA and OSM achieved in the
past, the future of the federal environmental watchdogs is bleak.
EPA budget and staffing has been cut from the 1981 levels for the
coming fiscal year24 and projections of the Office of Management
and Budget foretell greater future reductions.25 OSM faces similar
reductions in budget and staffing in the years to come.26
19. United States General Accounting Office, Issues Surrounding The Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act 12-16 (1979).
20. The Clean Air Act Oversight Hearings,- Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Environ-
ment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 525 (1981) (statement of George Freeman, Jr.)
[hereinafter cited as The Clean Air Act Oversight Hearings]; Enforcement of EnvironmentalReg-
ulations," Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); U.S. General Accounting Office,
Improvements Needed In Controlling Major Air Pollution Sources (1979); U.S. General Ac-
counting Office, More Effective Action By the Environmental Protection Agency Needed to
Enforce Industrial Compliance with Water Pollution Control Discharge Permits (1978); ABA
Standing Comm. on Envt. L., Environmental Enforcement (1978).
21. U.S. General Accounting Office, Issues Surrounding the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (1979); ABA Standing Comm. on Envtl. L., Environmental Enforcement
(1978).
22. Metropolitan Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639 F.2d 802,
804 (C.D. Cir, 1981).
23. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, THE SURFACE MINING CON-
TROL AND RECLAMATION ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89 (1977), reprinted
in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 625 [hereinafter cited as SMCRA REPORT].
24. EPA's budget for fiscal year 1982 will be $1.3 billion but the President has the discre-
tion to reduce the budget outlay to specific programs, including the abatement, control, and
compliance programs, by 5%. Current Developments, ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1052-53 (January 1,
1982). By the Spring of 1982, 400 to 800 jobs at EPA will be terminated. This figure does not
include the number of employees leaving their positions with EPA on their own volition. At-
trition is normally very high at EPA. No effort will be made to replace EPA staff members lost
through the normal turnover of employees. Current Developments, ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1107
(January 8, 1982).
25. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated that EPA will receive a
budgetary allocation of $1.126 billion in 1983 and $1.127 billion for 1984 to 1986. For 1983,
OMB foresees a budgetary outlay (the actual estimated expenditure by EPA) of $1 .175 billion,
and a budgetary outlay of $1.135 for 1984. EPA's estimated budgetary outlay for 1985 and
1986 is $1.127 billion. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revi-
sions, Additional Details on Budget Savings 294 (1981). EPA staffing will likely suffer further
cuts in 1984. Current Developments, ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1107 (January 8, 1981).
26. OSM's budget for fiscal year 1982 will be $160.6 million. Current Developments,
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1054 (January 1, 1982). Staffing will be reduced by 20% overall throughout
the OSM, with a 36% staff reduction in OSM's regulatory programs in 1982. Further reduc-
tions in OSM's budget and staff are foreseen as the federal government encourages the transfer
to the states of primary responsibility for surface mining regulations. United States Office of
A return of power to the states to regulate environmental activi-
ties is cause for concern. Despite the imperfections embodied in the
federal watchdog concept, the actions of EPA and OSM have
brought a greater degree of uniformity and toughness to environ-
mental law than could be achieved through the independent re-
sponses of the fifty states.27 The need for the watchdog over the
states has not diminished in the course of a decade. Arguably the
need to monitor the actions of states is greater now than in 1970
since environmental values may be sacrificed in favor of economic
growth by states pushing to revitalize their economies.28 United
States Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr. suggested the only via-
ble substitute for the diminished federal watchdog when he said, "If
everyone using the out-of-doors were to serve as a special pollution
watchdog we could work miracles in assuming universal enforce-
ment of pollution laws."29
III. The Citizen Watchdog
A. The Advantages of Citizen Watchdogs
Citizen participation in the enforcement of environmental laws
could have a salutary effect on both the regulators and the regulated
community.3 ° State and federal environmental agencies can only
perform a limited number of inspections at any one time.3 Permit
applications are a source of helpful information to regulatory agen-
cies but are prepared by a party with a personal interest in the out-
come of the application.32 In assessing the merits of a permit
application, a state environmental protection agency should have
complete access to all relevant local and regional land use considera-
tions as well as thorough knowledge of local environmental and cul-
tural conditions in order to arrive at a proper judgment.33 Citizen
participation in the administrative, appellate or judicial forum is a
Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions, Additional Details on Budget
Savings 217 (1981).
27. States vary considerably in the aggressiveness and effectiveness of their enforce-
ment programs. At any given time one or two states will be more aggressive than
EPA, half a dozen will effectively enforce in some situations but be powerless to do so
in others, and the remainder will normally be content with jawboning and issuing a
series of administrative orders and will rarely, if ever, resort to court.
The Clean Air Act Oversight Hearings, supra note 20, at 521 (statement of Jeffery Miller, former
Act. Asst. Administrator, Enforcement, EPA).
28. Id
29. Mercury Pollution and Enforcement of the Refuse Act of 1899, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Conservation and Natural Resources ofthe House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1049 (1971) (Appendix 7) [hereinafter cited as Mercury Pollution
Hearings].
30. The Clean Air Act Oversight Hearings, supra note 20, at 519 (statement of Jeffery
Miller, former Act. Asst. Administrator, Enforcement, EPA).
31. SMCRA REPORT, supra note 23, at 88, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 625.
32. Id
33. Id
practical and legitimate method to provide this information to the
environmental regulatory agency. Even assuming the issuance of
perfect permits by state agencies, comprehensive monitoring of envi-
ronmental activities can only be accomplished with the assistance of
an active citizenry.34
Assuredly, an overzealous citizenry is almost as damaging to
preservation of the environment as a dormant public. Frivolous citi-
zen suits have always been a concern of those advocating the "pri-
vate attorney general" concept." If an environmental agency must
justify the issuance of a permit, the agency allocates less time and
resources to enforce the conditions of the permit. Although critics of
citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes raise the specter of
the opening of a floodgate of litigation, little evidence supports this
position. Unsubstantiated lawsuits can be dismissed early in the pro-
ceedings,36 and the expense,37 if not the effort, required to investigate
the facts38 would discourage most meritless claims. Even if an award
of attorneys fees and costs were possible under a citizen suit provi-
sion, suits brought in bad faith would be ineligible for fees and costs
awards.39
The fear exists that even limited citizen control of an activity
with a potential to change the status quo could result in difficulty in
the settlement process. Environmental protection agencies must pos-
sess a degree of flexibility in their approach to the environment if
they are to balance the legitimate needs of a clean outdoors with the
necessity of economic progress. However, agencies should seek the
input of all concerned parties to ensure that all viewpoints are ad-
dressed in agency determinations. If the agency decision is adverse
to the interests of a citizen, the right of appeal should not be summa-
rily denied merely because the attitude of the citizen is viewed as
extreme or inflexible.4" Rather, the right of appeal may be appropri-
ately tempered by the economics of the appeal process. A citizen
who does not truly represent the public interest faces a costly appeal
of an agency decision and the likelihood of early dismissal of an
appeal, or an assessment of attorney fees and costs against him.4'
Pennsylvania law provides for citizen participation in the ad-
34. "The success or failure of a national coal surface mining regulation program will
depend, to a significant extent, on the role played by citizens in the regulatory process." Id
35. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Oversight Hearings, supra note 20, at 488 (statement of How-
ard Fox, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund); Mercury Pollution Hearings, supra note 29, at 105 1.
36. SMCRA REPORT, supra note 23, at 91 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 627.
37. Natural Resources Defense Council v. E.P.A., 484 F.2d 1331, 1337 (lst Cir. 1973).
38. Mercury Pollution Hearings, supra note 29, at 1051.
39. The Clean Air Act Oversight Hearings, supra note 20, at 488 (statement of Howard
Fox, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund; see infra text accompanying notes 80-92 for a discus-
sion of fee-shifting,
40. SMCRA REPORT, supra note 23, at 91 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 627.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
ministrative review process. Citizens may appeal any final Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources (DER) action to the
Environmental Hearing Board (EHB).42 Moreover, EHB rules per-
mit citizens to intervene in actions filed by DER or by disappointed
permit applicants.43 Even if appeals to the EHB are resolved by set-
tlement rather than litigation, DER must publish the details of any
proposed settlement in the Pennsylvania Bulletin to allow for public
comment and review. 44
Particularly at the state level, public participation in the en-
forcement of environmental statutes is not a new concept. In Penn-
sylvania, the Clean Air Act,4 5 the Clean Streams Act,4 6 and the
Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act47 allow citizen
suits to enforce the Acts' provisions.48 Although the nationwide ef-
fect of citizen suit litigation is significant, the volume of litigation
brought by citizens is quite insignificant .4  An analysis of the legal
and practical barriers faced by a Pennsylvania citizen provides an
excellent explanation for the paucity of citizen suits nationwide and
suggests methods to overcome these barriers.
B. Legal Barriers to the Citizen Watchdog
1. Notice and Timeliness. -Effective citizen participation in the
enforcement of environmental laws requires public awareness of all
activities that may affect the process. Notice of the actions of DER is
a particular problem in the permit application process.50 In accord-
42. EHB is an independent administrative tribunal, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 510-521
(Purdon Supp. 1981). All final actions of DER must be appealed to the EHB in order to
exhaust administrative remedies. Appeal of EHB decisions are made to the Commonwealth
Court. Id.
43. See 25 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 21.62 (Shepard's 1982) (EHB rules of procedure for inter-
vention); the Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.601(e) (Purdon Supp. 1981).;
Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.615 (Purdon Supp.
1981); Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.2 1(c)
(Purdon Supp. 1981) (provide citizens with leave to intervene in actions filed pursuant to the
relevant statute that may affect an interest of the citizen.)
44. 24 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 21.120 (Shepard's 1982).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4010(f) (Purdon 1977).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.601(c) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.21(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
48. The Solid Waste Management Act in Pennsylvania restricts citizen participation in
the administrative process to the right to intervene in actions brought by DER. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.615 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
49. "For the entire country, over the two year period from January 1979 to January 1981,
the Environmental Law Institute reported only 19 court opinions in cases where plaintiffs al-
leged citizen suit jurisdiction . . . industrial and state and local governments, however, ac-
counted for 37% of the opinions." Sandier, Citizen Suit Litigation, 23 ENv'T 38 (1981).
Sandier notes that the cases brought under citizen suit provisions usually have had a signifi-
cant impact upon environmental regulation. Id
50. When a law or regulation has been violated, the external effects causing the citizen to
bring suit will provide notice to the citizen that his interests have been adversely affected. In
the permit process, it is not until the permit is granted by DER that the activities complained
of by the citizen commence. When the permittee begins operation, the citizen will at that time
become aware of the adverse impact of the granting of the permit upon his interests, long after
ance with the Commonwealth Documents Law,5 DER must publish
notice of its actions in the weekly Pennsylvania Bulletin.52 Although
it is received and presumably perused by a number of institutions
and law firms, the Pennsylvania Bulletin in all likelihood is terra in-
cognita to the vast majority of citizens.53 Requiring publication of
permit applications in relevant local newspapers in general circula-
tion would provide effective notice of the details of permit applica-
tions. At present, applicants for permits under the Pennsylvania
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System54 and for mine
drainage permits under SMCRA55 must publish periodic notice of
their applications in local newspapers. DER should be required to
provide effective notice of other agency actions as well.
Effective notice is important because even if a citizen is unaware
of DER approval of a permit application, the citizen's right to appeal
the decision of DER to the EHB terminates thirty days after publica-
tion of DER approval in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.56 Appeal nunc
pro tune is denied in the absence of fraud, deception, coercion, or
duress.57 Although an untimely appeal merits the application of the
nuncpro tune doctrine when the dilatory party is the permit appli-
cant, absent the expansion of notice requirements, a more liberal at-
titude should also be adopted for other parties. Liberalization
requires amendment of the EHB Rules of Procedure because of the
position taken by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.58
2. Standing. -Federal courts have approached standing liber-
ally in environmental lawsuits challenging the actions of federal
agencies. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 9 the Court denied petitioners
standing to challenge Forest Service approval of a plan by Walt Dis-
ney Enterprises to build a multi-million dollar resort in the Mineral
the citizen's participation should have been felt. See J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT
102-03 (1971).
51. 45 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1102.1201-1102.1208, 1602 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
52. Id
53. See generally J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 102-03 (1971); Sandier, Citizen
Suit Litigation, 23 ENV'T 38, 39 (1981).
54. 25 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 92.61 (Shepard's 1982).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
56. The Judicial Act Repealer Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5571 (Purdon Supp.
1981). The thirty days begins to run after publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. Id
57. The doctrine ofnunepro tune appeals permits a party to maintain an untimely appeal
when fraud, duress, deception, or coercion prevented the party from filing notice of appeal on
time. West Penn Power Co. v. Goddard, 460 Pa. 551, 333 A.2d 909 (1975); Matter of Revoca-
tion of Restaurant Liquor License No. R-8030, 53 Pa. Commw. 468, 417 A.2d 1327 (1980);
Appeal of Girolamo, 49 Pa. Commw. 159, 410 A.2d 940 (1980).
58. See, e.g., Matter of Revocation of Restaurant Liquor License, 53 Pa. Commw. 468,
417 A.2d 1327 (1980); Appeal of Girolamo, 49 Pa. Commw. 159, 410 A.2d 940 (1980). The
Commonwealth Court's conservative approach to the issue of standing in environmental liti-
gation makes it unlikely that the directive to permit broader use of the doctrine of nunc pro
tunc appeals will come from the judiciary. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
59. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
King Valley. However, standing was denied only because the Sierra
Club failed to allege that its members used the Valley, 60 the com-
plaint did not demonstrate the individual "injury in fact" needed to
render the Sierra Club adversely affected by the Forest Service
Action.61
After Sierra Club v. Morton, federal courts required citizen as-
sociations challenging the actions of a federal agency to allege some
use of the threatened area by association members. The Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Procedures (SCRAP 1)62 demonstrates the extent of the liberal ap-
proach to standing at the federal level. In SCRAP I, the Court
granted standing to a small group of students challenging Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) approval of railroad rate increases.
The petitioners alleged that the ICC action would cause less incen-
tive to collect and re-use old cans and thus add to the expense of
recycled metals.63 Alleging further that the resultant increased litter
would adversely affect hikers, bikers, and boaters, SCRAP success-
fully survived a motion to dismiss the action for lack of standing.
64
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in William Penn Parking Ga-
rage, Inc. v. City ofPittsburgh,65 adopted the holdings of Sierra Club
and SCRAP 166 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, however,
steadfastly maintains that to possess standing a party must own
property at or near the area affected by agency action 67 and that
EHB should eschew the liberal standing doctrines of Sierra Club and
SCRAP L 61 The standing problem is not limited to citizens. The
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that municipalities lack
standing to appeal from the issuance of hazardous waste permits,
even when the permitted sites are located within the corporate
boundaries of the municipalities.69 Standing for government entities
is especially important because the municipalities may be the only
entities with sufficient resources to maintain an appeal.
If these standing issues are not resolved through the appellate
process, legislation will be required to allow serious litigants access
to the administrative review process in Pennsylvania.
60. Id at 735.
61. Id at 739-40.
62. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
63. Id at 680 n.9.
64. Id
65. 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975).
66. Id at 193, 346 A.2d at 281.
67. Western Pennsylvania Conservancy v. Department of Environmental Resource, 28
Pa. Commw. 204, 367 A.2d 1147 (1977).
68. Community College of Delaware County v. Fox, 20 Pa. Commw. 335, 342 A.2d 468
(1975).
69. Strasburg Assocs. v. Newlin Twp., 52 Pa. Commw. Ct. 514, 415 A.2d 1014 (1980);
Susquehanna County v. Department of Envtl. Resources and Lyncott Corp., 58 Pa. Commw.
381, 427 A.2d 1266 (1981).
3. Reviewability. -Since prior to final agency action a contro-
versy is not ripe for review, DER must take final action before its
conclusions are subject to review by EHB.7° Issuance by DER of a
notice of violation7 and DER refusal to modify a consent order
72
are not final actions since they do not change the challenging party's
legal status quo. On the other hand, DER's certification of a Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to
EPA 73 and its issuance of the first part of a two-part NPDES per-
mit74 are considered final actions. In general, reviewability of DER
actions should not trouble the would-be third party appellant. A
matter not ripe at the time of an initial appeal, such as an appeal
from the publication of receipt of an application, can be appealed by
the issuance of a permit based upon the application when the matter
ripens.
The most serious problem posed by the concept of finality is
illustrated by the EHB adjudication issued in the matter of George
Eremic. 75 In Eremic, the would-be appellant was the owner of prop-
erty abutting a landfill for which the DER had long since issued a
solid waste permit. The appellant alleged that the landfill operator
was not following the terms and conditions of the permit and was
creating a public nuisance at the landfill. When the appellant asked
DER to revoke the permit, DER not only refused but successfully
moved to quash Eremic's appeal because DER's refusal to revoke
the permit did not change the legal status quo and therefore was not
a final action.76
DER, indeed every administrative agency, affects citizens as
much by refraining from action as by undertaking action. To vindi-
cate their environmental rights, citizens must be able, at a minimum,
to challenge DER refusal to revoke a permit when grounds for revo-
cation exist. Federal courts have held that agency non-action is suf-
ficient action to obtain judicial review.7 7 DER could reasonably
object to a completely open right to appeal that was based only upon
an appellant's request to modify or revoke an outstanding permit
70. PA. R. Civ. P. 341.
71. Sunbeam Coal Corp. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 8 Pa. Commw. 622, 304
A.2d 169 (1973).
72. Department of Envtl. Resources v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., Inc., 25 Pa.
Commw. 389, 359 A.2d 845 (1976).
73. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 27 Pa. Commw.
356, 366 A.2d 613 (1976).
74. Albert M. Comly & Elizabeth H. Steele, No. 80-160-H (EHB May 13, 1981).
75. 1976 EHB 324 (Dec. 2, 1976).
76. 1d
77. Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(EPA's decision not to institute formal cancellation proceedings to pesticide DDT held review-
able); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. Securities Exch. Comm'n, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (SEC's refusal to institute proceeding to redress
violations of its rules held reviewable).
and DER failure to do so. Nothing prevents a troublemaker from
requesting revocation daily for no material or relevant reason. To
avoid this problem, refusals to revoke could be made actionable only
when the appellant pleads and proves that either there has been a
change in the conditions at the relevant site since the permit was
issued, or that all relevant factors were not considered when the per-
mit was issued.78
Overcoming the legal obstacles to challenging agency action
would result in a Pyrrhic victory for the citizen litigant, however, if
the citizen lacked sufficient funding to adequately prosecute a claim.
The cost of an appeal from an agency action can be prohibitive
whether the matter is before the EHB or a court of common pleas.79
Lack of sufficient funds for litigation represents the greatest barrier
78. The specific guidelines embodied in the Sewage Facilities Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 750.1-750.20 (Purdon 1977 and Supp. 1981), provide a model for the considerations that
must be present to require modification or revocation of a permit:
(i) any change has occurred in the physical conditions of any lands which will
materially affect the operation of the community sewage system or individual
sewage system covered by any permit issued by the local agency under section
7 of this act; or
(ii) one or more tests material to the issuance of the permit has not been properly
conducted, or
(iii) information material to the issuance of the permit has been falsified, or
(iv) the original decision of the local agency otherwise failed to conform to the pro-
visions of this act or the rules and regulations of the department, or
(v) the permittee has violated the rules and regulations of the department under
which the permit was issued ...
Id § 750.7(b)(6).
79. The cost of prosecuting a claim in a court is comparable to the costs of a trial-type
administrative hearing concerning similar issues. The Administrative Conference of the
United States found that the costs of administrative hearings frequently exceed ten thousand
dollars. Prolonged, multi-party proceedings can be even more expensive. Cramton & Boyer,
Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field- Peril or Promise, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 407, 417 n.33
(1972).
The appeal of a DER permit to EHB can be an enormously expensive matter. One com-
plex matter recently litigated before the EHB cost the appellant over $52,000, not including the
expense of an appeal to the commonwealth court. Another recent EHB appeal cost one of the
parties appellant approximately $40,000, while another party appellant to the same action
spent $90,000. Much of the cost of an appeal is the result of the expense of pre-hearing activi-
ties and fees for the retention of expert witnesses.
A typical case before EHB may require informal discovery, including a review of DER
records that can be time-consuming because DER records are sometimes quite voluminous.
Formal discovery, including depositions, interrogatories, requests for admissions, and motions
for production of documents often follows informal discovery. The prehearing phase of litiga-
tion may also require rulings on the scope and propriety of discovery, which may necessitate
preparation of pleadings and briefs. In addition, appellants must often respond to prehearing
motions, including motions to dismiss. Finally, an EHB case may consume many days of
hearing, require the review of transcripts, and may demand the preparation of post-hearing
briefs. See generally 25 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 21.2-21.23 (Shepard's 1982) for the rules of
procedure of EHB. Since many permit appeals revolve around complex scientific questions,
e.g., in which direction does groundwater flow, or which computer model most accurately
predicts the dispersion of air pollutants in the atmosphere, it may be necessary to employ one
or more technical experts, who may conduct field tests and laboratory analyses and prepare
reports. The expert witnesses may also assist in the discovery phase of litigation, review the
work product of experts employed by DER and other parties, assist in the hearing, and occa-
sionally testify. Experts are expensive. The total cost of purchasing technical expertise for an
EHB hearing may exceed the legal fees. See generally, Cramton & Boyer, supra.
to effective citizen enforcement of environmental laws. 80
B. Practical Barriers
Three tested methods to help citizens defray the costs of litiga-
tion are litigation trust funds, fee shifting, and qui tam actions.
1. Litigation Trust Fund -Although perhaps unrealistic dur-
ing a period of sharp budgetary cutbacks, a litigation trust fund to
aid citizens challenging DER actions could alleviate the reduced fed-
eral watchdog role without imposing an additional burden on the
losing party to the lawsuit. Several federal agencies have already
adopted the litigation trust fund concept to aid the participation of
indigent citizens in the administrative review process. 81 A properly
administered litigation fund could be the most equitable method to
recognize the inherent public cost of pollution.
82
2. Fee Shifting -A traditional method to defray the costs of a
lawsuit brought by a private citizen is the award by the court of rea-
sonable attorney fees and expert witness fees to any party.83 Envi-
ronmental statutes at the federal level84 and two Pennsylvania
environmental statutes85 permit the court or agency tribunal to
award litigation costs. The judiciary, however, has approached fee
shifting with hostility.86 Thus, overcoming the attitude of the judici-
ary requires statutory provisions for fee shifting.8 7
Fee shifting is permitted only if the litigant brings a claim in
80. Cramton & Boyer, supra note 76, at 422-23; M. OLSEN, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION, PUBLIC GOODS, AND THE THEORY OF GROUpS (Harv. Econ. Series No. 124,
1965).
81. Riesel, The Award and Shifting of Attorney Fees, in ALI-ABA Course of Study
Materials, Environmental Litigation 195, 244-46 (1981); Rody, Governmental Financing of Citi-
zen Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings A Practitioner's Outlook, 31 ADMIN. L. REV.
81 (1979); Comment, Agency Funding of Indgent Pub/ic Interest Intervenors in Administrative
Proceedings, 6 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,052 (1976). It has been estimated that at least ten million
dollars would be necessary to provide financial aid to indigent citizens wishing to participate in
the decisions of any federal agency. Rody, supra at 87.
82. The modem concept of the administrative process requires broad participation
of concerned groups in agency decisionmaking. This principle logically gives rise to
a call for financial aid to groups that cannot afford effective participation. Agencies
can provide aid in several ways, but the fairest and most efficient seems to be actual
subsidization of impecunious participants.
Note, Federal Agency Assistance to Impecunious Intervenors, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1837
(1975).
83. See generally Riesel, supra note 78.
84. See id (discussion of the federal statutory authority for fee-shifting).
85. The Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.601(g) (Purdon Supp. 1981);
The Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.21(e)
(Purdon Supp. 1981).
86. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (although the
group challenging Alaskan pipeline project was successful, lack of a statutory base for the
award of attorney fees and costs prevented the court from making any such award).
87. Id
good faith."8 Allowing the court to assess the plaintiff the litigation
costs of the defense when the lawsuit is filed for malicious reasons
deters frivolous lawsuits.8 9
Whether litigants obtain fees from a trust fund or by court
award, the calculation of fees is of central importance. Federal
courts that have wrestled with the question of reasonable attorneys'
fees have utilized several approaches. In Johnson v. Georgia High-
way Express, Inc., 90 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit listed
and discussed criteria to be considered in reaching a reasonable
award. 9' The Third Circuit, in an effort to create a more objective
measure of awards, has developed a different method to compute a
reasonable award of attorney fees.92 The court calculates a lodestar
figure based on the number of compensable hours multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate, then adjusts the lodestar for subjective fac-
tors indicative of the value of the delivered performance.
3. Qui Tam Actions. -Reimbursing the costs of litigation
through a litigation trust fund or fee shifting ensures that citizens are
not unduly discouraged from participating in the enforcement of en-
vironmental laws. As a further impetus to citizen action, the ancient
and honorable doctrine of qui tam could be resurrected. 93 This doc-
trine would encourage citizens to act as private attorneys general by
identifying and prosecuting violations of Pennsylvania's environ-
mental laws.
Qui tam suits are civil actions theoretically based upon the con-
cept of implied contracts in law. When a statute is passed, an im-
plied covenant arises that all persons will obey the law. A violator of
the statute breaches the implied contract. The statute specifies a pen-
alty for the breach and provides that certain persons have standing
to enforce the penalty. In a qui tam suit, the penalty is monetary and
88. See generally Riesel, supra note 78.
89. Id
90. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
91. The Johnson criteria are as follows: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experi-
ence, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (1I) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases. Id at 717-19.
92. Eg., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lindy H); Merola
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975) (Merola H); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 493 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1974) (Merola I); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitation Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I).
93. Literally qui tam means "Who as well _ " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1126 (5th
ed. 1979). The plaintiff sues for himself as well as the state in order to collect a penalty as-
sessed by statute. The plaintiff keeps part of the fine as a reward, the balance belonging to the
state. Id
the informer is given the right to bring suit on behalf of the govern-
ment to collect the debt owing for the violation of the statute.
94
The qui tam doctrine first arose in fourteenth century England95
because the police force was too rudimentary and inadequate to ef-
fectively enforce the law.96 In addition, a widespread mistrust of the
diligence of the police prevailed in England. 97 Qui tam actions have
a long history in America as well 98 and the United States Supreme
Court upheld a Pennsylvania qui tam statute in the 1805 decision of
Adams v. Woods.99
A qui tam statute is an ideal tool to provide strong enforcement
of environmental laws. t°° Unfortunately, the availability of this tool
was brought into question in the early seventies in a series of qui tam
suits. ' From 1970 to 1972, citizens filed eight different suits to col-
lect penalties for illegal dumping into navigable waters in violation
of the Refuse Act of 1899.102 Each suit was dismissed. While not
94. Comment, Qui Tam Actions and the Rivers and Harbors Act, 23 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 173, 187-90 (1971).
95. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., QuI TAM ACTIONS AND
THE 1899 REFUSE ACT 2-3 (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as Qui TAM ACTIONS]. Eng-
land abolished all qui tam statutes in 1951. See Comment, supra note 94, at 182; infra notes
115-19 and accompanying text.
96. Comment, supra note 94, at 180.
97. Comment, supra note 94, at 180.
98. See Comment, supra note 94.
99. 2 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 336 (1805).
100. Despite the increased sophistication of both English and American police forces, qui
tam provisions continued to be included in statutes because informers, encouraged by the
monetary rewards in qui tam statutes, were better able to ferret out minor but hard to detect
crimes, often the pattern in violations of environmental statutes. Comment, supra note 94, at
181.
101. The suits were pursuant to section 411 of the Refuse Act of 1899, which provides,
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall knowingly aid,
abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provisions of section 407, 408, and 409
of this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $2500 nor less than $500, or by imprisonment (in
the case of a natural person) for not less than 30 days nor more than one year, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, one-half of said fine
to be paid to the person or persons giving information which shall lead to conviction.
33 U.S.C. § 411 (1976). See generally Duiley, The Refuse Act of 1899, Monographs, ENV'T
REP. (BNA) No. 11 (January 7, 1972).
The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 404, 406-415, 502, 549, 686, 687 (1976)), is known as The Refuse Act of
1899. The statute empowered the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for the discharge
of refuse into navigable waters, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976), but the permit program lay dormant
until activated by Executive Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 986 (1970), reprinted in 33 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1970). The permit program of the Refuse Act of 1899 was initiated in 1970 because of
the shortcomings of state water pollution programs. Mercury Pollution Hearings, supra note
29, at 1052. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act's permit program superceded the permit
program of the Refuse Act of 1899. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4), (5) (1976).
102. See Enquist v. Quaker Oats Co., 2 E.R.C. 1601 (D. Neb. 1971). Lavagnino v. Photo-
Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. Scholze
Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tem. 1971); United States ex rel. Matson v. Northwest
Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States
Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Bass Angler Sportsman,
Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. and S.D. Ala.), af'dper curiam, 447 F.2d 1304
unsympathetic to the goals of citizen groups, the courts dismissed the
suits on two grounds. First, if qui tam suits were permitted under
section 411 of the Refuse Act, the court would be allowing the impo-
sition and collection of criminal penalties by a civil suit. Only the
Attorney General is empowered to bring penal action. Second, sec-
tion 411 only authorizes the award of informers fees, not qui tam
suits, to collect the awards.l°3 Although the United States Supreme
Court indicated in Marcus v. Hess"o that the authorization for qui
tam suits could be inferred in statutes permitting the award of in-
former fees,'0 5 only one state court opinion supported this dictum.'6
Without an express right to bring suit to collect an informers' fee,
citizen qui tam suits could not be brought. 1
0 7
The rationale of the various district courts provides a guide to
the necessary elements of the modern environmental qui tam statute.
Express authorization for citizens, after proper notice to the state, to
bring suit to collect civil penalties for violations of environmental
laws would address the problems encountered under section 411 of
the Refuse Act.'0 8 Currently, civil penalties can be assessed against
violators of several of Pennsylvania's environmental laws. 0 9 Citi-
zens may not, however, initiate or participate in such awards if DER
brings suit.1 10 Redrafting the statutes to permit qui tam suits would
encourage citizen participation in preserving the environment.
The greatest fear of critics of qui tam statutes is that the lure of
informer fees will induce strike suits against industry. I"' Unlike fee
shifting or a litigation trust fund, qui tam statutes provide a positive
incentive for citizen involvement. Litigants who seek a qui tam re-
ward should not receive litigation funds from fee shifting or the liti-
gation trust fund. Meritless lawsuits would thereby be prevented by
the refusal of attorneys to accept suits on a contingent fee basis if the
(5th Cir. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Durning v.
ITT Rayoneer Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
103. See 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1976).
104. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
105. Id at 541 n.4.
106. Chicago and Alton R.R. v. Howard, 38 Ill. 414 (1865).
107. See, e.g., Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
108. See Kafin & Needleman, The Use of Qui Tam Actions to Protect the Environment, 17
N.Y.L.F. 130 (1971), for a discussion of a proposed New York qui tam statute.
109. See The Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.605 (Purdon Supp. 1982-
83); Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4009.1 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82); Penn-
sylvania Solid Waste Management Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.605 (Purdon Supp.
1981-82); The Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 1396.22 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
110. See The Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.605 (Purdon Supp. 1981);
Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4009.1 (Purdon 1977); Pennsylvania Solid
Waste Management Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.605 (Purdon Supp. 1982-83); The Sur-
face Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.22 (Purdon
Supp. 1982-83).
11I. See Kafin & Needleman, supra note 108, at 139; Mercury Pollution Hearings, supra
note 29, at 1051.
suits have little chance of success." 2 All settlements could be ap-
proved by the court or EHB, thereby deterring citizens from prose-
cuting suits with hope only of settling for nuisance value.II 3 Finally,
detailed technical information is usually necessary for successful
prosecution of an environmental suit. The likelihood of perjury is
diminished when the lawsuit becomes a battle of expert witnesses. '4
While England abolished all qui tam statutes in 1951," 5 it was not
because of the abuse of the statutes by informers 1 6 but because of
the frivolous nature of the statutes permitted to be enforced by qui
tam suits. 1 17 In the United States, litigants have rarely abused qui
tam statutes," 8 indicating that a return to qui tam suits in environ-
mental law would be a positive step toward a cleaner environment.
Traditionally, qui tam statutes set the informer fee at one-half
of the assessed penalty. " 9 A modem environmental qui tam statute
should give the trial court or EHB greater flexibility to decide who
deserves an award and the amount of the award. The total amount
of the civil penalty should reflect an amount sufficient to encourage
citizen participation, discourage deleterious activity, and provide
funds to remedy damage to the environment. 120 Particularly when
the state, rather than the informer, brings suit based on information
provided by the informer, guidelines should designate the proper re-
cipient of an award. In United States v. Anaconda Wire & Cable
Co., 121 the court formulated useful guidelines. The court placed the
onus on the government contesting the award of an informer fee pur-
suant to section 411 of the Refuse Act to demonstrate that the gov-
ernment suit was independent of the citizen's information.
22
Requiring the informer to demonstrate that he was the sole or crucial
source of information is an impossible task since the informer must
delve into the motives of the United States Attorney. 123 A showing
that the informer supplied information adequate to initiate an inves-
tigation should qualify the informer for an award. 1
24
The court in Anaconda Wire also provided a catalogue of ele-
ments to be considered in calculating an informer fee award. The
award should be based on the time and expense incurred by the in-
112. See Kafin & Needleman, supra note 108, at 139.
113. Id See also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
114. Kafin & Needleman, supra note 108, at 139.
115. Comment, supra note 94, at 182.
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id at 191 n.74.
119. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §411 (1976).
120. United States v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 342 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
121. Id
122. Id at 1123.
123. Id
124. Id
former to gather the information, the value of the information to and
the effect on the government investigation, and the amount of en-
couragement necessary to induce action by other informers with sim-
ilar information. 125
Qui tam suits can be an effective weapon to assure vigilance by
state governments when the federal watchdog role is reduced, and
would assure vigilance merely by dusting off a forgotten legal
mechanism.
IV. Conclusion
Industry regulated by DER is likely to possess a high degree of
interest in obtaining a permit for their activities as well as the eco-
nomic strength, technical competence, and organizational cohesion
necessary to defend its position. 126 Persons adversely affected by the
permit decision are unlikely to have the resources to mount an effec-
tive attack against the issuance of a permit by DER, or to bring a
polluter to task. ' 27 If we are dedicated to preserving and enhancing
the environment, legal and practical barriers to active citizen partici-
pation must be removed so that citizens can replace EPA and OSM
as the enforcers of environmental laws.
Citizen participation does not obviate the need for strong and
effective environmental protection agencies at all levels of govern-
ment. Only federal action can implement national standards and
goals, which are necessary to address the migratory nature of pollu-
tants. States are the primary administrators of environmental pro-
grams that have been formulated. Proper administration of permit
programs can eliminate potential pollution problems before they
arise. Citizen participation can only serve as a supplement to agency
action but the supplement could ensure a healthy and progressive
environment for future generations.
125. Id at 1122.
126. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100-01 (N.D. Cal. 1972), a#'d, 488 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. deniedsub nor California Highway Comm'n v. La Raza Unida, 417
U.S. 968 (1974).
127. Id

